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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SLOVITER, Chief Judge. 
 
Appellants, five police officers for the City of Allentown, 
filed this action asserting that they were denied promotions 
because they openly opposed or failed to support the 
candidacy of William Heydt for mayor of Allentown and/or 
supported his rival, John Pressman. The officers charged 
that the City, Mayor Heydt, and Officer Glenn Kerrigan, 
president of the Fraternal Order of Police, who was a Heydt 
supporter, deprived them of their First Amendment rights 
in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42 U.S.C.§ 1985(3). 
They also alleged that Kerrigan individually breached his 
duty of fair representation and that Mayor Heydt violated 
their First Amendment rights to petition for redress of 
grievances by denying them access to the courts. 
 
As in most cases involving a contested employment 
action in which the district court granted summary 
judgment for the defendants, we must focus on whether the 
plaintiffs adduced sufficient evidence to permit the fact 
 
                                2 
finder to draw the inference that the employment action 
was motivated by an impermissible consideration. If so, 
plaintiffs have established the genuine issue of material fact 
that precludes summary judgment unless the evidence 
shows the challenged action would have been taken in any 
event. To make that decision, we must review the facts 




FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
The candidates for mayor of the City of Allentown in the 
1993 election were Democrat John Pressman and 
Republican William Heydt. Chief of Police Wayne Stephens 
was a Pressman supporter, as were a number of high- 
ranking police officials. Glenn Kerrigan, who had been 
president of the Fraternal Order of Police (the"FOP") since 
1992, was a Heydt supporter, as were a number of other 
police officers, including Richard Suppan, Gerald Dieter 
and James Bowser who were all union officers or members 
of the union negotiating committee. The FOP is the 
recognized bargaining agent for the police, albeit not for 
certain high ranking officials. There is some evidence that 
the relationship between the FOP leadership and the Chief 
of Police and his immediate advisors was somewhat 
rancorous: the FOP officers believed that Chief Stephens 
was antagonistic towards them on account of their union 
activities and the police administration did not approve of 




The Preamble of the FOP's Constitution and Bylaws 
states that the FOP is "strictly non-political." App. at 269. 
The parties differ as to whether that precludes the FOP 
from endorsing a candidate. Much of the evidence centers 
on the endorsement, later rescinded, of candidate Heydt 
and the part that issue played in Heydt's decision not to 
promote the plaintiffs. 
 
During the primary election, candidate Heydt visited 
Chief Stephens in an effort, according to Stephens, to gain 
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the Department's endorsement. Stephens declined, 
testifying later that he did not believe the Department 
should make endorsements. He also testified that he was a 
vocal Pressman supporter in the Department and among 
neighbors and friends. Subsequently, Heydt criticized the 
management of the Police Department on a number of 
grounds and his remarks were reported in an Allentown 
newspaper. Plaintiffs allege that FOP leaders, including 
Kerrigan, were providing Heydt with information concerning 
the administration of the Police Department. 
 
On September 7, 1993, candidates Pressman and Heydt 
made brief statements at the FOP's regular monthly 
meeting. James Bowser moved to endorse Heydt's 
candidacy, but the vote resulted in a 16-16 tie. Kerrigan, 
who was presiding, declined to cast the tie-breaking vote. A 
motion was passed that no endorsements be made until 
after the candidates' forum, which could be attended by all 
members of the FOP. This forum was held on September 
28, 1993. Officer Fulmer, also a Heydt supporter, had 
circulated a petition requesting a special meeting of the 
FOP to be called the next day, September 29, in order to 
endorse a candidate. 
 
The manner in which the September 29 meeting was 
called and publicized is another matter of dispute. Kerrigan 
contends that he was mandated by the Bylaws to call a 
special meeting upon receipt of a request signed by ten 
members. Plaintiffs allege that it was unusual for a special 
meeting to be called the day after the candidates' forum, 
particularly because there was a regular monthly meeting 
scheduled for the next week. A number of officers later 
complained that the September 29 meeting was not 
adequately publicized to the FOP membership. 
 
Candidate Heydt was endorsed by the FOP membership 
at the special meeting held on September 29 by a vote of 36 
to 2 with 4 abstentions. Most of Officer Fulmer's platoon 
attended the meeting; many of the FOP members who had 
attended the September 7 meeting did not. 
 
The regularly scheduled FOP meeting on October 5 was 
contentious, with some members, including a Heydt friend 
and presumably supporter, expressing reservations 
 
                                4 
concerning the FOP's endorsement policy. By a vote of 44 
to 12, the endorsement of candidate Heydt was rescinded. 
What was said and by whom at this meeting is one of the 
bases for the plaintiffs' claim that their failure to support 
Heydt led to their non-promotion. Heydt was elected Mayor 
of Allentown on November 2, 1993, and took office on 




In 1992, before the events at issue here, when Joseph 
Daddona was Mayor of Allentown, the FOP, headed by 
Kerrigan, and the Allentown Police Department, with Wayne 
Stephens as the Chief of Police, negotiated a new promotion 
procedure for the positions of patrol sergeant, investigative 
sergeant, patrol lieutenant and investigative lieutenant. 
This was codified as General Order 309 of the Allentown 
Police Department. This new promotion procedure was 
followed in 1993 to produce promotion lists for the above 
positions. The agreed-upon procedure does not entail 
objective tests but provides that promotion lists are 
compiled following an evaluation by a five-person committee 
including the Chief of Police, the Assistant Chief of Police, 
the Deputy Assistant Chief of Police, one Captain, and the 
candidate-officer's primary supervisor. A candidate's 
placement on the list is based upon these "oral interview/ 
evaluation" scores, which account for eighty percent of the 
total score, and seniority, which accounts for twenty 
percent. Promotions could be made from the top three 
names on the list, with the Chief of Police able to pass over 
any particular candidate only twice. If three positions 
opened, the top three candidates had to be chosen. 
However, if only one position was to be filled, the first two 
candidates could be skipped twice. After that, any 
subsequent open positions would have to be filled by the 
skipped candidates. 
 
The lists were officially publicized on November 1, 1993, 
just prior to the mayoral elections held that week. The five 
plaintiffs ranked highly. James Stephens rankedfirst for 
investigative lieutenant and first for patrol lieutenant; 
Hanna ranked third for investigative lieutenant and fourth 
for patrol lieutenant; Vitalos ranked first for investigative 
sergeant and second for patrol sergeant; Longo ranked 
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third for patrol sergeant and fourth for investigative 
sergeant; Moyer ranked third for investigative sergeant. 
 
In contrast, the policemen who were in the FOP 
leadership scored near the bottom of the sergeants lists. 
Kerrigan ranked twenty-eighth on both the investigative 
and patrol sergeants lists; Suppan ranked thirty-first for 
investigative sergeant and thirtieth for patrol sergeant, 
Dieter ranked thirty-third on both lists, and Bowser ranked 
thirty-fourth on both lists. None were ranked on the 
lieutenants lists. We were advised by counsel at argument 
that there were sufficient openings so that each of the top 
three candidates would have been promoted. 
 
Police Chief Interviews 
 
Immediately following his election, Mayor Heydt met with 
Chief Stephens and informed him that he would not rehire 
Stephens as Police Chief. According to Stephens, Heydt also 
accused him of manipulating the promotion lists to arrange 
for Angel Santos, an Hispanic officer, to placefirst on the 
patrol sergeants list and second on the investigative 
sergeants list in order to accommodate candidate 
Pressman's promises to promote more Hispanics within the 
Police Department. Stephens also alleges that Heydt 
accused him of nepotism in regards to his brother James 
Stephens' position on the lists and that Heydt harangued 
him on the operation of the department in general, 
specifically criticizing a number of the Captains. 
 
In December 1993, Heydt interviewed Assistant Chief 
Monahan, Captains Mitchell, Berndt, Manescu and Bennis, 
and John Stefanik, a retired former Captain in the 
department, for the Chief of Police position. Ultimately, 
Heydt selected John Stefanik as the new Chief of Police. 
Stefanik had been a Heydt supporter and had worked at a 
polling place for Mayor Heydt during the election. 
 
Unfair Labor Practices Challenge 
 
On December 20, 1993, the FOP filed an Unfair Labor 
Practice ("ULP") charge with the Pennsylvania Labor 
Relations Board (the "PLRB"), claiming that the sergeants 
promotion lists were invalid because anti-union animus on 
part of the evaluators resulted in artificially depressed 
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scores for Kerrigan, Kulp, Suppan, Bowser, and Dieter, five 
officers who held union positions or were members of the 
union's collective bargaining committee. 
 
Seven officers including Angel Santos and four of the five 
plaintiffs here attempted to intervene in the PLRB 
complaint on the ground that the action was not supported 
by the general membership of the FOP and was detrimental 
to them. Their request to intervene was denied. 
 
While the PLRB complaint was pending, no promotions 
were made, either from the sergeants lists which were at 
issue in the Unfair Labor Practice charge or from the 
lieutenants lists even though those lists had not been 
challenged. Mayor Heydt stated in his deposition that he 
did not want to make sergeant promotions in light of the 
PLRB complaint. He also stated that he did not want to 
make lieutenant promotions because he thought that 
James Stephens' name was at the top of the lists because 
of nepotism, and because of an unrelated state court action 
brought by captains and lieutenants against the City of 
Allentown charging that the City had failed to comply with 
Pennsylvania's Wage Payment and Collection Act ("Act 204") 
regarding wages for managerial-level police officers. The Act 
204 suit was filed in state court in October 1994, and 
Mayor Heydt has testified that he did not want to promote 
anyone to lieutenant in order to avoid increasing the 
number of plaintiffs joining in the suit. 
 
On September 21, 1995, a little less than two years after 
the ULP complaint was filed, the PLRB hearing examiner 
issued a proposed order invalidating the 1994-95 
promotion lists for investigative sergeants and patrol 
sergeants, and ordered the City to refrain from making 
promotions until a new list was developed. The hearing 
examiner found that Chief Stephens and his immediate 
deputies gave some scores of lower than 4 in violation of 
the applicable procedure. The examiner also found that the 
scores given by Chief Stephens and his immediate deputies 
to Kerrigan, Dieter and Suppan were tainted by anti-union 
animus, though not those of Kulp or Bowser. The PLRB 
adopted the hearing examiner's findings and conclusions, 
except as to Dieter, and issued a Final Order dated October 
8, 1996, directing the City to void the 1994-95 promotion 
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lists and to refrain from making promotions to sergeant 
until a new list was developed. The City and the FOP cross- 
appealed in the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania and, 
in a memorandum opinion, the court dismissed the appeals 
as moot because the promotion lists had expired by 
operation of law at the end of 1995. See City of Allentown 
v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Bd., No. 3027 C.D. 1996, 
slip op. at 5-6 (Pa. Commw. Ct. May 23, 1997). 
 
Following the invalidation of the sergeants promotion 
lists, the City has not promoted to the ranks of either 
lieutenant or sergeant as of the time of oral argument 
before us. 
 
The Instant Action 
 
The first complaint in this consolidated action was filed 
by James Stephens, Anthony Longo and David Moyer in 
January 1995. They sued Mayor Heydt, the City of 
Allentown, and Glenn Kerrigan, and alleged a conspiracy in 
violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985(3) to deny them 
promotion because of their political affiliation. They also 
asserted pendent state law claims against Kerrigan. In 
December 1995, Joseph Hanna and Mark Vitalos filed a 
complaint raising the same claims, but they added a count 
for Mayor Heydt's "illegal attempt to deny access to the 
courts to other[s] eligible to be promoted to lieutenant." 
App. at 134. They based this claim on Heydt's testimony 
that he did not want to promote more officers who could 
become plaintiffs in the Act 204 lawsuit against him and 
the City. Stephens, Longo and Moyer sought leave to amend 
their complaint to add this count. 
 
Following discovery, the district court granted the 
defendants' motions for summary judgment on the§§ 1983 
and 1985(3) claims in favor of all three defendants, 
dismissed plaintiffs' breach of fair representation and state 
constitutional claims, and denied the motion of Stephens, 
Longo, and Moyer to amend their complaints after 
determining that the access to the court's claim failed to 
state a cause of action. Plaintiffs do not contest the district 
court's dismissal of the breach of fair representation and 
state constitutional claims, but argue on appeal that the 
district court improperly granted summary judgment to the 
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defendants on their §§ 1983 and 1985(3) claims. Hanna 
and Vitalos argue that the district court erred in dismissing 
their right to access claim, and Stephens, Longo and Moyer 








Applicable Legal Principles 
 
In Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 372-73 (1976), and 
again in Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 514-15 (1980), the 
Supreme Court held that it is unconstitutional for public 
agencies to discharge employees who are neither 
policymaking nor advisory based on their political 
affiliations, reasoning that an employee's exercise of First 
Amendment rights outweighs the government's interest in 
maintaining a system of political patronage. The Court 
expanded upon Elrod and Branti in Rutan v. Republican 
Party of Illinois, 497 U.S. 62, 75 (1990), where it held that 
promotions, transfers, recalls, and other hiring decisions 
involving public employees may not be based on party 
affiliation and support unless the government can show 
that party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the 
position involved. Moreover, as Elrod-Branti teaches, "[a] 
citizen's right not to support a candidate is every bit as 
protected as his right to support one." Bennis v. Gable, 823 
F.2d 723, 731 (3d Cir. 1987). Thus, Rutan encompasses 
claims of political discrimination when an employer takes 
an adverse employment action because s/he does not want 
to fill employment positions that would otherwise be 
available to his or her supporters. See Rutan , 497 U.S. at 
67-68; Bennis, 823 F.2d at 731. 
 
A political discrimination case employs similar, though 
not identical, burden-shifting mechanisms as those used in 
other employment discrimination contexts, such as Title VII 
cases. See Acevedo-Diaz v. Aponte, 1 F.3d 62, 66 (1st Cir. 
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1993). To make out a prima facie case, public employees 
who claim that they suffered from an adverse employment 
action based on their exercise of a constitutional right must 
show that they worked for a public agency in a position 
that does not require a political affiliation, that they were 
engaged in constitutionally protected conduct, and that the 
conduct was a substantial or motivating factor in the 
government's employment decision. See Robertson v. Fiore, 
62 F.3d 596, 599 (3d Cir. 1995); Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 
F.2d 1195, 1200 (3d Cir. 1988); Laskaris v. Thornburgh, 
733 F.2d 260, 265 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 886 
(1984). Once the employee makes this demonstration, the 
employer may avoid a finding of liability by proving by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the same employment 
action would have been taken even in the absence of the 
protected activity. See Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of 
Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977); Robertson, 62 
F.3d at 599. 
 
It is not disputed that the plaintiffs are public employees 
and that the positions of sergeant and lieutenant do not 
require a political affiliation. This court's review of the 
district court's summary judgment rulings is plenary. 
Summary judgment will be proper "if the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories . . . show that there 
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A court must view all facts and 







In granting summary judgment for Heydt and the City, 
the district court held that "[t]he plaintiffs in this case have 
not produced evidence sufficient to establish that Mayor 
Heydt knew their political affiliations" and that "[t]he 
plaintiffs have not presented any direct evidence that Mayor 
Heydt refused to promote the plaintiffs in order to leave 
room for his own political supporters." Dist. Ct. Op. at 5, 8. 
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Heydt states in his sworn affidavit and in his deposition 
testimony that he did not know the plaintiffs' political 
affiliations or whether they opposed or supported his 
candidacy for mayor. He notes that only James Stephens 
spoke publicly against his endorsement at the October 5 
FOP meeting - a meeting that Heydt did not attend- and 
that plaintiffs Longo, Moyer, Hanna, and Vitalos never 
publicly expressed support for or opposition to either 
candidate. Plaintiffs assert that it was well-known among 
their co-workers that they supported Pressman and 
opposed Heydt's endorsement. They argue that it is 
reasonable to infer that Heydt also knew this information 
because Heydt's FOP supporters knew the identities of the 
officers who opposed Heydt's endorsement and these 
supporters had a close political relationship with Heydt and 
advised Heydt on personnel matters before and after his 
election. 
 
The district court declined to draw any inferences 
favorable to the plaintiffs from the record evidence, citing 
Geraci v. Moody-Tottrup, Int'l., Inc., 82 F.3d 578 (3d Cir. 
1996), for the proposition that "when an employerfiles 
declarations that he did not know of an employee's 
membership in a protected class, the jury may not infer 
such knowledge from the employee's having told other office 
workers of her condition." Dist. Ct. Op. at 6. 
 
In Geraci, a Title VII case, this court upheld the district 
court's grant of summary judgment to the defendant- 
employer, holding that the employee could not prove that 
she was fired on account of her pregnancy because she 
failed to proffer any evidence that the employer knew that 
she was pregnant. See 82 F.3d at 597. Geraci argued that 
because she told six of twenty co-workers of her pregnancy, 
it became a common topic of discussion in the office and 
therefore her managers had to have known of it when they 
decided to fire her. In their affidavits, the managers 
disclaimed knowledge and Geraci deposed only one co- 
worker, who testified that he did not tell management of 
Geraci's pregnancy. No other evidence of knowledge was 
offered. See id. at 582. 
 
We do not read Geraci as holding that a jury may never 
infer knowledge on the part of an employer when the 
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employee proffers evidence that the information was 
generally known to co-workers. In Geraci, the only evidence 
presented was that the six knowledgeable co-workers 
complied with Geraci's request not to reveal her pregnancy. 
The court also noted that there was undisputed evidence 
that management had decided to lay-off Geraci before she 
herself knew that she was pregnant. See id. In light of those 
facts, we declined to remand the case based on "sheer 
speculation that one or more of the people she entrusted 
with highly personal information violated her confidence 
and that members of . . . management lied about their lack 
of knowledge." Id. (emphasis in original); cf. Clark v. 
Clabaugh, 20 F.3d 1290, 1299 (3d Cir. 1994) (Seitz, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 
In this case, there is evidence that the political affiliations 
of the members of the Police Department constituted more 
than workplace rumor; the heated and contentious debate 
over the endorsement of Heydt for Mayor drew clear lines 
between those who supported Heydt and those who did not. 
 
Joseph Hanna stated in his deposition testimony that 
"[t]here developed clearly two factions within the police 
department at this point. The Kerrigan, et al. faction, as I 
would describe them, were pro William Heydt. The other 
faction were pro Jack Pressman." App. at 429-30. 
 
According to Assistant Chief of Police Gerald Monahan, 
(who is not a plaintiff) the identities of the members of each 
faction were widely known among the employees of the 
Police Department. He testified: 
 
A. I think you kind of knew where -- what side of the 
fence guys were lining up on in terms of -- I don't 
mean to insinuate that everybody on [sic] the 
department is political. But at that particular time you 
knew which guys were kind of lining up on the 
Pressman side of the fence, and it was obvious after 
awhile who was lining up on the Heydt side of the 
fence. 
 
. . . 
 
Q. And during that political campaign of 1993, were 
you also aware of Mr. Kerrigan's political position vis-a- 
vis mayoral candidates? 
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A. I knew which side of the fence he was on, so to 
speak. 
 
Q. And that would have been? 
 
A. He was supporting Mr. Heydt. 
 
Q. Mr. Heydt. I take it then which side of the fence 
people were on was no secret? 
 
A. No it was not. 
 
App. at 820-21. 
 
The plaintiffs testified in their respective depositions that 
they were vocal in their opposition to Heydt's endorsement 
and that this was known throughout the Department. 
James Stephens testified that after raising objections to the 
September 1993 special meeting called to endorse 
candidate Heydt, he was "told to sit down and shut up, 
because [he] had a political agenda, by Mr. Suppan, Mr. 
Fulmer and Mr. Kerrigan." App. at 780. He further stated 
that at the October 5 FOP meeting, he was sitting at a table 
with other individuals who opposed Heydt's endorsement, 
including Moyer and Longo, and that he was "elected to go 
up [to the podium] and give our views on what was going 
on." App. at 783. He described the October 5 meeting as 
"very volatile," noting that a number of "people [were] 
standing up and yelling" including Officers Longo and 
Moyer and a "number of people sitting at our table that 
were quite upset." App. at 783. 
 
Heydt argues that the mere fact that groups of opposing 
political supporters existed within the department does not 
support an inference that he personally knew who was in 
those particular groups. He cites Laskaris v. Thornburgh, 
733 F.2d 260, 265 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 886 
(1984), a case in which plaintiffs, employees of the 
Pennsylvania Department of Transportation, claimed that 
they were fired because they were Democrats. The only 
evidence offered by the plaintiffs was a letter from a state 
representative saying that it was time to "clean-out the 
political hacks" at the agency; no evidence was offered to 
show that the managers of the department responded to 
this letter by firing the plaintiffs or that, of the 15,000 
patronage jobs that existed, theirs were specifically 
 
                                13 
targeted. See id. at 265-66. Nor were the plaintiffs able to 
show that any of the other fifty employees who were fired 
were dismissed because of their political affiliations. The 
case proceeded to a bench trial and the district court found 
that the plaintiffs had not adduced enough evidence to 
show that the persons responsible for the plaintiffs' firing 
knew that they were Democrats. We upheld the judgment, 
stating that although the evidence had the "vague aura of 
politically motivated patronage firings . . . it is far too 
insubstantial to show that the individual plaintiffs here 
were discharged because of their political affiliations." Id. at 
266. 
 
In contrast, plaintiffs here have offered circumstantial 
evidence showing that there was an information "pipeline" 
between Heydt and his FOP supporters. Significantly, 
Captain Mitchell, who was a neighbor and personal friend 
of Heydt, testified that during his interview with Mayor 
Heydt for the Chief of Police position, Heydt asked him why 
he spoke out against his endorsement at the October 5 FOP 
meeting, though Heydt had not been present at the 
meeting. Mayor Heydt also told Captain Mitchell that he 
knew that there was going to be litigation concerning the 
promotion lists. See app. at 869-70. In his own deposition, 
Heydt testified that he knew who his own supporters within 
the Department were but denied knowing who his 
opponents were, despite admitting that he confronted 
Mitchell with the fact of his disloyalty. See  app. at 747-48. 
 
There is also evidence that there was continuing contact 
between the FOP leadership, including Kerrigan, and Heydt 
concerning the management and personnel policies of the 
Police Department. While on its face it might seem natural 
to have such a relationship, plaintiffs point out that the 
usual channel for such communications and advice would 
be through the Chief of Police and his deputies, not 
through individual union leaders who were low ranking 
members of the Police Department. Indeed, there was 
testimony in seven depositions that the FOP leadership 
prepared and submitted a "master" reorganization plan for 
the Police Department to Heydt after his election. See app. 
at 448 (deposition of J. Hanna); 804 (deposition of W. 
Stephens); 855 (deposition of R. Manescu); 894 (deposition 
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of F. Peters); 902 (deposition of W. Berndt); 944 (deposition 
of T. Bennis). Heydt, in turn, submitted the plan to Chief 
Stefanik. Stefanik confirmed the existence of such a plan, 
but claimed that it was not utilized. App. at 963-64. 
 
There is other evidence as well. Captain Berndt, who 
characterized the FOP leadership - Kerrigan, Fulmer, 
Suppan, Dieter, Smith and Bowser - as the "mayor's boys," 
testified as to the significance of the connection between 
the Mayor and the FOP leadership: 
 
Q. In your discussions with Chief Stefanik about the 
influences of this group of people that you indicated as 
the mayor's boys, Mr. Suppan, Mr. Fulmer, Mr. Smith, 
Mr. Dieter, Mr. Kerrigan, and Mr. Bowser, what were 
Chief Stefanik's reactions? What did he say about 
those influences during your discussions with him? 
 
A. Well, I think he agreed that those specific officers 
had an influence on the mayor or had an input to the 
mayor or something that caused the mayor to utilize 
the information received from those officers in his 
running of the city. 
 
Q. Now, as I would understand, in the department the 
chain of command would go from any member of the 
police department to the chief before it would go to the 
mayor. Is that correct? 
 
A. That's correct. 
 
Q. And are you saying that in your conversations with 
Chief Stefanik, that there was a diversion of this chain 
of command in terms of somebody going to the mayor, 




. . . 
 
Q. Did Chief Stefanik confirm to you in words or 
substance that that's what he was saying, that this 
group of people was influencing the mayor outside of 




App. at 903-04. 
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Captain Bennis and Officer Hanna expressed similar 
views regarding the management of the department. Bennis 
stated in his deposition that "[s]everal people in the FOP 
. . . are directing which way the department goes," 
including "Fulmer, Dieter, Suppan, Kerrigan, maybe 
Bowser, maybe Charlie Kulp; I don't know about the last 
two." App. at 946. Hanna recounted a conversation he had 
with Chief Stefanik, 
 
at which time the chief . . . when he referred -- the 
chief would refer to "he" and would point back to city 
hall, referring to the mayor. When he referred to"they," 
it was my understanding he was referring to the 
mayor's supporters. 
 
 My question to the chief at that time was: "You mean 
to tell me that there are a handful of patrolmen that 
have more clout with the mayor than you do as chief 
of police?" His answer to that was yes. 
 
App. at 526-27. 
 
Although evidence of a direct link between the Mayor and 
the FOP leadership does not necessarily show any 
impropriety, in the context of this case a factfinder could 
believe it lends credence to the plaintiffs' contention that 
although Heydt was not present at the October 5th meeting 
he was advised of the position of the participants through 
his line of communication with the FOP leaders, who were 
present. Heydt was told of Mitchell's sentiment at the 
meeting and a plausible inference could be drawn that the 
same sources informed him of the names of the other 
officers who were outspoken, either in opposing his 
candidacy or in opposing any FOP endorsement of a 
candidate. James Stephen spoke out and sat at the same 
table with some of the other plaintiffs. Of the plaintiffs, only 
Joseph Hanna, who was out of town, did not attend. 
Nonetheless, if the positions of the members of the force 
were as well known as some of the witnesses testified, he 
also may have been identified with the others. These are 
facts that would have to be proven, but on this record we 
cannot sustain the district court's grant of summary 
judgment which was based on lack of sufficient evidence of 
Heydt's knowledge of plaintiffs' political preferences or non- 
support to create a material issue of fact. 
 





Heydt and the City argue that mere presence on the 
promotion lists does not guarantee promotion, that the City 
is under no obligation to ever make promotions, and that 
because no promotions from the lists have yet been made 
plaintiffs have failed to plead an element of their prima 
facie case. This argument could be viewed analytically as 
one challenging the sufficiency of plaintiffs' evidence on 
injury, causation, or pretext. We address the preliminary 
question of injury first. 
 
We have held that while an employee may have a 
legitimate claim of entitlement to his or her place on a 
promotion eligibility list that would give rise to a right to 
procedural due process, the employee does not have a 
"substantive right" in the position itself if the promotion 
does not automatically follow from the employee's 
placement on the list. Stana v. School Dist. of City of 
Pittsburgh, 775 F.2d 122, 125-26, 131 (3d Cir. 1985). 
However, plaintiffs in this case have not asserted a 
procedural due process claim. In a political discrimination 
case under the Elrod-Branti-Rutan trilogy, a plaintiff is not 
required to establish a property interest in the denied 
position, but instead must show that the employment 
decision was based on an impermissible motive. See 
Acevedo-Diaz, 1 F.3d at 68 n.5; Santiago-Negron v. Castro- 
Davila, 865 F.2d 431, 436 (1st Cir. 1989). Although the 
Mayor had no obligation to make any promotions, if the 
plaintiffs' political affiliation was a substantial or motivating 
factor in his decision not to promote them, they have 
established a basis for finding the requisite causation. See 
Robertson, 62 F.3d at 599. 
 
Of course, a plaintiff must be able to show some realistic 
threshold causal connection between the injury suffered 
and the defendant's unlawful conduct. See Doherty v. 
Rutgers School of Law-Newark, 651 F.2d 893, 902 (3d Cir. 
1981). In Doherty, we considered the issue in terms of the 
standing of an applicant to a state university law school to 
challenge an alleged discriminatory minority admissions 
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program. We held that Doherty did not have standing 
because he did not possess the qualifications to have been 
admitted to the school even in the absence of the 
admissions program he was contesting. After reviewing the 
Supreme Court's decision in Regents of University of 
California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), and determining 
that Bakke did not "reflect an abandonment of all [the 
Court's] analysis of standing developed in other cases," 
Doherty, 651 F.2d at 902, we held that while Doherty had 
asserted an injury - loss of a place in the law school - he 
could not show that he had been injured as a result of the 
law school's minority admissions program, because he had 
no realistic chance of admission. Id. at 900-01. 
 
Similarly, in Howard v. New Jersey Dept. of Civil Service, 
667 F.2d 1099, 1101 (3d Cir. 1981), we held that plaintiffs 
did not have standing to challenge the physical agility test 
administered by the Newark Police Department as 
discriminatory against women because the plaintiffs had 
not passed the initial civil service examination that was a 
prerequisite for taking the physical test. Plaintiffs had 
suffered a distinct and palpable injury but because they 
were refused employment on account of their failing the 
written test, the physical agility test could not have caused 
their loss of job opportunity; therefore the benefits of the 
invalidation of the test could not possibly accrue to them. 
Id. at 1101-02. 
 
Because these plaintiffs, unlike Doherty and Howard, are 
ranked within the top three places on one or more of the 
promotion lists, they would have been among those few 
officers to be considered for promotion if promotions were 
made. Thus, their claims do not fail for the same reasons 
as those that precluded the claims in Doherty  and Howard. 
 
Heydt and the City argue that although it was not the 
basis for the district court's decision, we may affirm on the 
ground that plaintiffs have not produced enough evidence 
from which a reasonable jury could find that plaintiffs' 
protected activities were a substantial or motivating factor 
in not making promotions from the sergeants or lieutenants 
lists. See Rich v. United States Lines, Inc., 596 F.2d 541, 
551 (3d Cir. 1979) (affirming on ground other than that 
relied on by district court since parties had the opportunity 
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to present evidence and argue the issue); see also Horsey v. 
Mack Trucks, Inc., 882 F.2d 844, 847 n.3 (3d Cir. 1989); 
PAAC v. Rizzo, 502 F.2d 306, 308 n.1 (3d Cir. 1974)(citing 
Helvering v. Gowran, 302 U.S. 238, 245 (1937)), cert. 
denied, 419 U.S. 1108 (1975). 
 
Once Heydt has articulated a nondiscriminatory reason 
for the employment action, here the failure to promote, 
plaintiffs may prevail by discrediting that proffered reason, 
either circumstantially or directly, or by adducing evidence, 
whether circumstantial or direct, that discrimination was 
more likely than not a motivating or substantial cause of 
the adverse action. See, e.g., Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 
759, 764 (3d Cir. 1994); Torre v. Casio, Inc. , 42 F.3d 825, 
830 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 
Plaintiffs vigorously challenge Heydt's proffered reasons 
for failing to promote. We consider the sergeants lists and 





Though Heydt presents a number of reasons for failing to 
promote from the sergeants lists, his primary reason is the 
fact that the sergeants lists were the subject of an Unfair 
Labor Practice complaint before the Pennsylvania Labor 
Relations Board. Plaintiffs seek to cast doubt on this reason 
by claiming that Heydt was complicitous in the bringing of 
the ULP action and that he was a party to its inadequate 
defense. The only support for the former claim is Captain 
Bennis' testimony that Heydt had indicated to him, in his 
interview, that there would be litigation over the lists. 
However, Bennis was not sure of the date of his interview 
with Heydt and thus cannot be sure if the PLRB charge had 
been filed yet or not. See app. at 940-43. 
 
Even if Heydt knew of the filing of the charge, plaintiffs 
have not produced evidence to support their contention 
that he was complicitous in failing to defend the charge 
adequately. Their sole evidence for that fact is the 
testimony of two police officers that the Assistant 
City Solicitor defending the department, Patricia 
Siemiontkowski, was not being aggressive enough at the 
hearing and that she failed to give former Chief Stephens 
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notice of the hearing so that he could be called to testify. 
The plaintiffs have not shown that Mayor Heydt influenced 
the City Solicitor's Office to choose Siemiontkowski to 
defend the action, nor did they show that her performance 
was inadequate. In fact, one of the officers who commented 
about Siemiontkowski's lack of expertise testified at 
deposition that he was satisfied with her representation of 
the City and did not believe the City's defense was a 
"sham." App. at 829, 834 (deposition of G. Monahan). More 
significantly, there is no evidence that Heydt tried to 
influence the proceedings in any way. Although plaintiffs 
complain that Siemiontkowski failed to contact Chief 
Stephens to testify, she stated that she attempted to 
contact Chief Stephens repeatedly but that he was unable 
to attend because he had booked clients for his hunting 
lodge on the date of the hearing. App. at 1006. 
 
Plaintiffs do provide the testimony of Captain Peters who 
was told by Heydt while the City was defending the 
sergeants lists that "somebody better do something about 
that list because I guarantee you nobody will get promoted 
off of it." App. at 895. Plaintiffs would have us read that 
statement as indicating an impermissible motive, but it is 
equally as consistent with Heydt's claim that he would not 
promote from the lists while they were subject to the ULP 
complaint. 
 
It is undisputed that the ULP charge was filed before 
Heydt actually assumed his position as Mayor and that the 
PLRB concluded that the sergeants lists were tainted and 
directed the City not to use those lists as the basis of 
promotion. The decision of the PLRB thus substantiates 
Heydt's reluctance to promote from the sergeants lists. 
 
Plaintiffs Vitalos, Longo, and Moyer were in the top tier of 
three on one or both of the sergeants lists. Their claim of a 
constitutional violation is limited to the time prior to the 
PLRB's decision, when Heydt had the option to promote 
them. Even if Heydt's reluctance to promote was colored by 
his view that they had been in an opposite political camp 
during the election, we believe that a reasonable jury could 
not have attributed their lack of promotion to that basis 
when the sergeants lists, which had been under attack, 
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were thereafter invalidated. Thus summary judgment on 




Heydt's failure to promote from the lieutenants lists 
stands on a different footing because the lieutenants lists 
were not subject to an ultimately successful ULP action 
before the PLRB. Heydt has never clarified his reasons for 
not making promotions from the lieutenants lists, on which 
plaintiffs James Stephens and Joseph Hanna were among 
the top three. Plaintiffs have pointed to a number of 
inconsistencies in Heydt's statements to show that his 
reasons were pretextual and which a trier of fact could 
credit in concluding that Heydt was motivated by politically 
discriminatory criteria. Plaintiffs need not discredit each 
proffered reason individually. If plaintiffs cast substantial 
doubt on a fair number of Heydt's reasons, they will survive 
summary judgment. See Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 764 n.7. Heydt 
first argues that he had campaigned on a platform of 
reducing the top brass in the Police Department and 
therefore sought to reduce the number of lieutenants. 
However, this is belied by the testimony of Chief Stefanik, 
who indicated in his deposition that any reduction in 
management-level officers would probably come from 
attrition and not from limiting promotions. App. at 959. At 
best, Stefanik's testimony is ambiguous; it is not clear that 
a reduction in top brass was a leading Heydt priority, nor 
that such reduction would come from not making 
promotions. 
 
Heydt relies more strongly on the claim that he did not 
want to add more plaintiffs to the Act 204 wage suit against 
him and the City by promoting officers into management 
positions. Indeed, this was the basis for the claim of Hanna 
and Vitalos alleging that by failing to promote them on this 
ground Heydt interfered with their First Amendment right 
to petition for redress of grievances. Although we do not 
disagree with the district court that this is not the type of 
action that gives rise to an action for denial of access to the 
courts, a fact finder could reasonably find that this 
justification was pretextual. 
 
The Act 204 lawsuit brought by the lieutenants and 
captains was not cited in Heydt's affidavit as a reason for 
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failing to promote from the lieutenants lists. It only 
surfaced when, at his deposition, Heydt mentioned it as an 
additional factor in his decision-making. However, plaintiffs 
offer evidence that prior to that lawsuit Heydt had already 
decided not to promote from the lieutenants lists for the 
two years the lists would be operative because James 
Stephens, Chief Stephens' brother, was on the top of the 
lists. See app. at 942 (deposition of T. Bennis). The 
testimony that new promotion lists were being prepared by 
the FOP to be submitted in a master plan to the Mayor, see 
app. at 855 (deposition of R. Manescu), also could show 
that Heydt sought to exclude these plaintiffs. 
 
There is evidence that Heydt's real concern was that 
James Stephens was first on the lists; he claimed that the 
lists were a product of nepotism. However, Heydt has not 
substantiated this charge, and it appears that Heydt made 
it inconsistently. In his affidavit, Heydt condemned all the 
promotion lists as being based on "nepotism and friendship 
with the former Police Chief." App. at 969. But during his 
deposition testimony, when questioned concerning his 
reasons for failing to promote from the lieutenants lists, 
Heydt stated that his only problem with the lists was "that 
Jim Stephens was at the top of both lists," and that no 
other officers owed their ranking on the lists to favoritism. 
App. at 741-42. 
 
Heydt's charge that all the lists were tainted by favoritism 
could be viewed as a post-hoc justification to prevent 
appointment of Stephens, who was the most vocal 
opponent of Heydt's endorsement and whose familial 
relationship to the Chief of Police was well known. 
Significantly, Heydt's disinclination to promote Stephens 
may have adversely affected Hanna, the only other plaintiff 
high enough on the lieutenants list to have a realistic 
possibility for promotion. Captain Monahan testified that 
Hanna's name came up in discussions with Heydt, and that 
Monahan tried to convey to the Mayor that "he really needs 
to look at [Hanna] on his own and formulate his own 
opinion." App. at 826. Monahan stated that he was 
concerned that certain officers were "getting painted with 
the [Chief] Wayne Stephens' brush." App. at 827. At oral 
argument, we were advised that Hanna is currently serving 
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as an acting lieutenant, a fact that also seems to cut 
against Heydt's justification based on favoritism. 
 
Heydt has never claimed that the individuals at the top 
of any of the lists are unqualified for the positions, nor is 
there any evidence in the record that would indicate that 
the officers who were top ranked on the lists were 
undeserving. In fact, Captain Manescu testified that he told 
Heydt that he did not have a problem with any of the 
officers to be promoted from the lists. App. at 846. This was 
echoed by other Captains interviewed for the Chief of Police 
position. See app. at 826-27 (deposition of G. Monahan); 
app. at 942 (deposition of T. Bennis). Significantly, Chief 
Stefanik acknowledged that he "probably would" promote 
from both lists if it were not for the PLRB decision 
invalidating the sergeants lists. App. at 962. In light of the 
totality of this evidence, a fact finder might give little 
credence to the charge of nepotism or favoritism concerning 
the lieutenants lists. Considering the history of animosity 
between Chief Wayne Stephens and Mayor Heydt, and the 
fact that James Stephens was the most outspoken 
opponent of Heydt's endorsement, a jury could reasonably 
find that Heydt's reasons for not promoting from the 
lieutenants lists are pretextual. We conclude that Stephens 
and Hanna have made a sufficient showing to discredit 
Heydt's proffered reasons for not promoting from the 
lieutenants lists and thus are entitled to have a fact finder 
determine whether their political affiliation or non-support 





Claims Against Kerrigan 
 
Plaintiffs' complaint asserts the same claim under§ 1983 
as to Kerrigan as it does against Heydt and the City. 
However, Kerrigan is a private actor who does not ordinarily 
act "under color of state law." To succeed against a private 
defendant in a § 1983 suit, a plaintiff must show that 
"there is a sufficiently close nexus between the State and 
the challenged action so that the latter may be fairly treated 
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as that of the State itself." Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 
1004 (1982) (internal citation omitted); see Burton v. 
Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961); Melo v. 
Hafer, 912 F.2d 628, 638 (3d Cir. 1990), aff 'd, 502 U.S. 21 
(1991). 
 
Only if Kerrigan acted "with the help of or in concert with 
state officials" to deprive plaintiffs of their constitutional 
rights will plaintiffs have demonstrated the state action 
requirement under the Fourteenth Amendment that 
underlies a § 1983 claim. McKeesport Hosp. v. Accreditation 
Council for Graduate Med. Ed., 24 F.3d 519, 524 (3d Cir. 
1994); see Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152 
(1970); Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137, 1142 (3d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 165 (1995). 
 
The crux of plaintiffs' conspiracy theory is that"Kerrigan 
and Heydt . . . agreed that, if elected, Defendant Heydt 
would fire then Chief of Police, Wayne Stephens and help 
advance Kerrigan's career by subverting the . . . promotion 
list procedures. In exchange . . . Kerrigan agreed to arrange 
for [the FOP] to publicly endorse Heydt." Complaint, app. at 
18. As noted earlier, plaintiffs have adduced circumstantial 
evidence indicating that Heydt was receiving information 
concerning the management of the Police Department that 
may be inferred to have come from members of the FOP 
leadership. However, there is little, if any, evidence that 
Kerrigan conspired with Heydt specifically with regard to 
plaintiffs' promotions. 
 
The FOP endorsement preceded the publicizing of the 
promotion lists. By the time the promotion lists came out, 
which was the week before the mayoral election, the FOP 
endorsement had already been rescinded. At the time 
Kerrigan and the FOP leadership campaigned for Heydt's 
endorsement, they could not have known that they had 
placed low on the lists and that plaintiffs had placed high. 
 
Plaintiffs contend that an inference can be drawn that 
Kerrigan, as president of the FOP, sought to influence 
Mayor Heydt's staffing decisions regarding police personnel 
in a significant way, and that Heydt may have acted on 
these recommendations. They offer no evidence that 
Kerrigan's alleged advice, even if politically motivated, rose 
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to the level of a conspiracy between Kerrigan and Heydt, so 
much so that it can be said that a "working relationship" 
existed by which Kerrigan was "drap[ed] . .. with the power 
of the state." Cruz v. Donnelly, 727 F.2d 79, 82 (3d Cir. 
1984). 
 
Here, like in Cruz, there is no basis tofind that the 
decisionmaker relinquished his power to make promotions. 
See id. at 81. The choice to make staffing decisions 
remained that of the Mayor. At most, Kerrigan's advice - if 
indeed he gave any - was favorable to the FOP leadership. 
In the absence of any evidence from which a reasonable 
fact finder could determine otherwise, we cannotfind that 
Heydt "clothe[d] [Kerrigan] with the under color of state law' 
vestment." Melo, 912 F.2d at 639. 
 
Plaintiffs have also sought to assert a claim against 
Kerrigan under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). Section 1985(3) 
provides for recovery of damages against "two or more 
persons in any State [who] conspire . . . for the purpose of 
depriving . . . any person . . . of having and exercising any 
right or privilege of a citizen of the United States." The 
district court dismissed the § 1985(3) claims on the ground 
that that section does not authorize relief for discrimination 
based on political association. 
 
This court has "reserved comment on whether `1985(3) 
embraces private conspiracies to discriminate on the basis 
of other factors other than race,' " Robison v. Canterbury 
Village, Inc., 848 F.2d 424, 430 n.7 (3d Cir. 1988) (quoting 
Rogin v. Bensalem Township, 616 F.2d 680, 697 (3d Cir. 
1980)); see also C&K Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 704 
F.2d 690, 700 (3d Cir. 1983), although we note that other 
circuits have held that it does, see, e.g, Hobson v. Wilson, 
737 F.2d 1, 21 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied , Brennan v. 
Hobson, 470 U.S. 1084 (1985); Keating v. Carey, 706 F.2d 
377, 379 (2d Cir. 1983); Glasson v. City of Louisville, 518 
F.2d 899, 912 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 930 (1975), 
and some district courts in this circuit have agreed, see 
Perez v. Cucci, 725 F.Supp. 209, 249-51 (D.N.J. 1989), 
aff 'd, 898 F.2d 139 (1990). 
 
Once again we do not have to resolve that question, 
because the predicate of § 1985(3) liability is a "conspiracy," 
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and, as discussed above, plaintiffs have not provided 
sufficient proof of a conspiracy between Heydt and Kerrigan 
to survive summary judgment. We will accordingly affirm 
the district court's entry of judgment in Kerrigan's favor 






For the foregoing reasons we will reverse in part and 
affirm in part and remand to the district court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
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